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Capital Gains Treatment of an Interest in Future Profits
Pounds, a real estate broker and expert appraiser, assisted Elrod, an-
other broker, in selling land to Gilson. Neither the seller nor Gilson paid
a commission to Pounds or Elrod. Instead, Gilson orally agreed to pay
each of them twelve and one-half per cent of the net profits from a
subsequent sale of the land.! Pounds purchased Elrod's interest in the
possible future profits for $2,500. The contract written by Gilson subse-
quent to this transaction recognized that Pounds held no title interest in
the land and that the twenty-five per cent of net profits, if and when
realized, was in consideration for personal services rendered in arranging
the purchase. In 1959 Gilson sold the land in accordance with the agree-
ment and remitted $14,481.14, twenty-five per cent of the net profits, to
Pounds. Pounds reported the amount received as a long-term capital gain
with a basis of $5,000.' The Commissioner interpreted Pounds' gain as
ordinary income. Pounds paid the deficiency and brought suit in the federal
district court for a refund. He argued, inter alia, that the agreement be-
tween Gilson and himself constituted a joint venture. After the district
court dismissed the action, Pounds appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Held,
affirned: The original twelve and one-half per cent interest in the profit
is compensation for services rendered and therefore ordinary income, while
the twelve and one-half per cent interest acquired by purchase fails as a
capital gain for lack of a sale or exchange. Pounds v. United States, 372
F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1967).
I. THE CAPITAL GAINS PROVISION
Congress established the capital gains provision in the Revenue Act of
1921 to permit the taxpayer to avoid the high surtaxes imposed on ordi-
nary income under the progressive income tax system. The purpose of
Congress was to afford capital gains treatment only in situations typically
involving the realization of appreciation in value accrued over a sub-
stantial period of time to ameliorate the hardship of taxation of the en-
tire gain in one year.' The capital gains provision is an alternative tax
computation available only for income derived from the sale or exchange
of a capital asset which increased in value. A capital gain is the amount
received from the sale or exchange of a capital asset in excess of the cost
or other basis of the capital asset. A capital loss exists if the receipts from
the sale or exchange of a capital asset are less than its cost at acquisition or
other basis. A capital gain or loss is considered long-term if the capital
asset was held for more than six months' and short-term if held for six
months or less."
'It was further agreed that taxes, interest, and other expenses would be paid and recovered by
Gilson before net profits would exist.
$2,500 for the purchase of Elrod's interest and an equal amount for his own interest.
' Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965); Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc.,
364 U.S. 130 (1960); Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955); Burnet v.
Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
4 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1201(b) [hereinafter referred to as the Code].
5id. 5 1222(3), (4).
6Id. 1222(1), (2).
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Throughout the forty-six year history of the capital gains provision, the
basic requirement that there be a sale or exchange of a capital asset has
remained unchanged. Both elements of this requirement, "sale or exchange"
and "capital asset," must be present before the reporting of gains and losses
as capital gains and losses is permitted.7 The Internal Revenue Code de-
fines a capital asset as property, but imposes certain enumerated exclusions.!
The taxpayer's interest qualifies as a capital asset if it does not fall under
one of the five listed exclusions and if the subject matter of the transaction
meets the court's interpretation of property. Property is a word of very
broad meaning, and when used without qualification may reasonably be
construed to include obligations, rights, and other intangibles, as well as
physical things. Property within the tax laws should not be given a narrow
or technical meaning.! However, since the capital gains provision is an
exception to the usual tax liability, the definition of a capital asset is
"narrowly applied and its exclusions interpreted broadly."' 0 The term
capital asset connotes the investment of money in property, with a result-
ing appreciation in value accruing over the requisite length of time."
Unlike the lengthy definition of a capital asset, the 1954 Code contains
no definition of a sale or exchange. The substance of the transaction and
not merely its form must be examined before a determination can be made
as to the existence of a valid sale or exchange for capital gains treatment."
A sale usually means a transfer of property for cash, its equivalent, or
'Grill v. United States, 303 F.2d 922 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry Co.,
39 T.C. 15 (1962); J. Francis Driscoll, Jr., 37 T.C. 52 (1961); INT. REV. CODE of 1954, 55
1202, 1222(1), (2), (3), (4); J. MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION S 22.91 (1966).
'INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 1221 (capital asset defined).
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "capital asset" means property held by the tax-
payer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include-
(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would
probably be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of
the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of his trade or business;
(2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is subject to
the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, or real property used in his
trade or business;
(3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, or similar property,
held by-
(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property, or
(B) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property is determined, for
the purpose of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole or in part by
reference to the basis of such property in the hands of the person whose personal
efforts created such property;
(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade or
business for services rendered or from the sale of property described in paragraph
(1); or
(5) an obligation of the United States or any of its possessions, or of a State or
Territory, or any political subdivision thereof, or of the District of Columbia, issued
on or after March 1, 1941, on a discount basis and payable without interest at a
fixed maturity date not exceeding one year from the date of issue.
'Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1950); Citizens State Bank v. Vidal, 114 F.2d 380
(10th Cir. 1940).
"
0Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955).
" Pridemark v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965); United States v. Woolsey, 326
F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1964).
"2Bisbee-Baldwin Corp. v. Tomlinson, 320 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1963); Marsan Realty Corp., 32
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 5 63,297 (1963); Martin Weiner, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1 62,044 (1962);
Sidney Weisner, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 5 61,234 (1961); Conrad N. Hilton, 13 T.C. 623 (1949);
Wilhelmina Deauth, 42 B.T.A. 1181 (1940).
the transferee's promise to pay cash."3 An exchange is essentially a barter,
differing from a sale in that the consideration received by the transferor
consists, at least in part, of property other than cash.' The words "sale or
exchange" as used in section 1222 and other capital gains sections of the
1954 Code are thus given their normal and ordinary meaning.1'
II. RIGHTS TO FUTURE PROFITS AS COMPENSATION FOR
SERVICES RENDERED
A broad area always treated as ordinary income is that of compensation
derived from personal services. " The compensation, in whatever form re-
ceived, is measured for tax purposes at its fair market value.' If the
value is not ascertainable, no income is realized and no tax is imposed when
the compensation is received." The compensation is taxed when it is
realized, when the transaction becomes closed. Compensation received in
the form of a promissory note constitutes a closed transaction, and ordi-
nary income is realized." The discounted value of the note is its ascertain-
able fair market value. In order for a transaction to be closed and there-
fore constitute realized ordinary income, the property received can be in
the form of cash or a cash equivalent. Although courts generally say
that executory contracts are not the equivalent of cash," the contract re-
ceived by Pounds for his services is freely disposable and not so contingent
on uncertain events as to make its value unascertainable. The court in
Pounds did not discuss whether the interest received by Pounds had an
ascertainable value. But it did state that the transaction's character as com-
pensation for services rendered did not change since the transaction merely
staed open until the land was ultimately sold." The court further stated
thata real estate agent's ordinary income derived from compensation for
personal services in selling land cannot be transmuted into capital gain by
'"Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965); Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450 (10th Cir.
1951); Gruver v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1944); Galvin Hudson, 20 T.C. 734
(1953); J. MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 22.92 (1966).
" 'Exchange' is a word of precise import, meaning the giving of one thing for another, re-
quiring the transfers to be in kind, and excluding transactions into which money enters either as
the consideration or as a basis of measure .... The term is almost synonymous with 'barter.' " Tren-
ton Cotton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 33, 36 (6th Cir. 1945). See also J. MERTENS, FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION § 22.92 (1966).
"Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 249 (1941), "Generally speak-
ing, the language of the Revenue Act, just as in any statute, is to be given its ordinary meaning,
and the words 'sale' and 'exchange' are not to be read any differently." See also Trenton Cotton
Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1945); Hale v. Helvering, 85 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir.
1936); Louis W. Ray, 18 T.C. 438 (1952), reasoning aff'd, 210 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1954).
" Craig M. Smith, 33 T.C. 465 (1959); David L. Gordon, 29 T.C. 510 (1957); Merton E.
Farr, 11 T.C. 552 (1948).
"Maxfield v. United States, 152 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1945); Whitlow v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d
569 (8th Cir. 1936); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (1) (1957).
"
8
Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
"Continental 1ll. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. 11. 1955);
Paul M. Potter, 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 5 46,050 (1946).
"°Bedell v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1929); Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C. 560
(1950).
"Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941); Holt v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.
1962); David L. Gordon, 29 T.C. 510 (1957); B. BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION 581 (3d ed. 1964).
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measuring its value in terms of possible profits from the sale of the land."
The court failed to recognize that there is a difference in compensation
measured by the value of future profits and a freely transferable interest in
the proceeds which is the compensation. The interest Pounds received for
his services rendered was freely transferable (Pounds purchased an identi-
cal interest from Elrod), and if its value was fully ascertainable, the court
incorrectly held that the transaction remained open.
There is little difference between the contract right actually received by
Pounds and the right he would have held if he had received his commis-
sion, reported and paid taxes on it, and then invested it in a right to the
future, uncertain profits. The courts should properly allow the $2,500
basis because they do not hold the value of interests unascertainable ex-
cept in extraordinary circumstances. The fact that Pounds paid Elrod
$2,500 for an identical interest is support for the conclusion that the value
is ascertainable. In addition, the application of the normal commission rate
to the purchase price of the land shows that the $2,500 basis is very near
the appropriate commission. 4 If so, the taxpayer should have reported and
paid taxes on this interest in 1954 when the contract was made. Therefore,
in the instant case the taxpayer could claim that the $2,500 was taxable
at an earlier year, barred by the statute of limitations, and should not be
taxable in the current year." Thus the tax for the current year should be
on the excess of the $14,481.14 over $5,000. This excess still will be taxed
as ordinary income since, as the court pointed out, no sale or exchange
took place.
III. RIGHTS TO FUTURE PROFITS AS AN INVESTMENT
In order for an investment to result in a capital gain, there must be a
sale or exchange of a capital asset.
Capital Asset. The courts make a distinction between the future right
to earn income and the future right to earned income. That distinction
is the difference between the right to earn an uncertain amount of income
(a capital asset) as opposed to the right to an already ascertained amount
of earned income (assignment of income)." The right to earn an un-
certain amount of income becomes a property right owned by the pur-
22 Pounds v. United States, 372 F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1967).
aBoudreau v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1943); Treas. Reg. S 1.1001-1 (a) (1957);
Rev. Rul. 402, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 15.
24 The purchase price of the land was $102,000. With the normal commission rate of 5 per cent,
the commission to be divided by Pounds and Elrod would have been $5,100. Pound's commission
would have been $2,550.
2 Such procedure might not work. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1312(7).
2" United States v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 324 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963).
27 The distinction being made between certain or earned income and uncertain income or the
right to earn income is the difference between the purchase of something possibly worthless or with
a possible increase in value and something the value of which is fixed and definite. The fact that
the income would be measured by a fixed percentage of increment of value does not make the
right one to earned income. The purchased right could still produce no income if no increase in
value occurred even though the percentage is fixed.
[Vol. 21
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chaser" with a basis measured by the consideration given.2 Although in
the present case the right to any future income was already earned in the
sense that Elrod had already performed his services, the property right
that Pounds purchased was in the form of an investment. It was an asset,
a right, a property which would produce income. This investment con-
tained the usual risk of capital in that the value of real estate can either
increase or decrease appreciably. Pounds could have lost his entire invest-
ment of $2,500, or an appreciable gain could result, as actually happened.
Although the courts are inclined to avoid the capital asset question,
where permissible," by examining only the sale or exchange question, where
the cases do furnish decisions concerning the capital asset question" the
result is that a naked contract right to future profits will not be held to
be a capital asset." It has long been settled that a taxpayer does not bring
himself within the capital gains provision merely by fulfilling the simple
syllogism that a contract normally constitutes property, that he held a
contract, and that his contract does not fall within a specified exclusion."
Something more is needed; the questioned property must have more "sub-
stance"' than a mere contractual right. The recent decisions have indicated
that for contractual rights to create capital assets, the taxpayer must either
have what might be called an "estate" in," or an "encumbrance""8 on, or
an option to acquire an interest in 7 property which, if itself held, would
be a capital asset. Because the court in Pounds assumed a capital asset did
exist, these cases were never mentioned. They also seem clearly distinguish-
able from the present fact situation. The naked contract right deemed
insufficient to constitute a capital asset is usually held by an original con-
28 Assignments of income rights by the earner for cash or property, measured by the
then worth of such rights, may not be disregarded, and as respects such earner-
assignor, he has elected to anticipate normal realization by assigning or discounting
such right. Consideration received by him represents ordinary income realized by him
upon the anticipatory assignment of his rights to income. Once such rights to income
from property or for services are separated from the earner by his act of assignment,
they become property rights owned by the purchaser or assignee with a basis in his
hands measured by the consideration paid.
G.C.M. 24849, 1946-1 CUM. BULL. 66, 68.
"INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, § 1012.
" When the courts assume the taxpayer's interest or right to be a capital asset, they ultimately
conclude that capital gains are not present by a failure of the transaction constituting a sale or
exchange. The same result could undoubtedly be reached by determining whether a capital asset
is present or not, illustrating the courts' reluctance to tackle the problem.
"Dorman v. United States, 296 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1961); Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Coln-
missioner, 282 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1960); Commissioner v. McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc., 210
F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. Ray, 210 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1954); Commissioner v.
Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1952).
aSee, e.g., Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1958).
' Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp. Inc., 364 U.S. 130 (1960); Commissioner v. Ferrer,
304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962); Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARV.
L. REv. 985 (1956).
"' Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1958).
' Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1960) (release of lessee's
entire interest to a sublessee); Commissioner v. McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc., 210 F.2d 752
(2d Cir. 1954) (a lessee's surrender of his lease to the lessor); Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200
F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1952) (same).
2Commissioner v. Ray, 210 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1954) (lessee's relinquishment of right to
restrict lessor's renting to another tenant in same business).
2 7Dorman v. United States, 296 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1961) (abandonment of option to acquire
a partnership interest).
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tracting party who is not an investor."8 Pounds was not an original con-
tracting party, and he was an investor in the future, uncertain profits from
the sale of the real estate involved. Pounds invested his capital in the hope
that the contract or property right purchased would appreciate in value
over the required period of time and result in a gain."9 The investment
aspect of the contract right is the dominant factor, for contract rights
acquired by investors, analogous to the rights held by Pounds, are deemed
to be capital assets.' The classification of this interest as a capital asset be-
comes more apparent if a third party purchases the interest from Pounds,
for then it is held by an investor who is in no manner connected with the
original transactions.
In this difficult area many cases"' do not decide the capital asset ques-
tion; rather, the courts assume the right to be a capital asset, and then
consider only the sale or exchange question. An example of this line of
cases analogous factually to Pounds is Jones v. Commissioner." In this
case an assignor had a possible claim for additional compensation against
the United States. The United States was being sued by the assignor's
general contractor. The assignor assigned his right to any amount subse-
quently due from this claim in consideration for $10,000 and a promise
to pay his income taxes for three previous years. The court held that the
consideration to the assignor was ordinary income and any amount re-
ceived by the assignee above the consideration paid was ordinary income
because of a failure to meet the capital gain requirement of a sale or
exchange. The court answered the assignee's query as to capital gains
treatment by saying that he had "sold nothing." 3 The assignee's interest
is analogous to the interest that Pounds purchased from Elrod. The Fifth
Circuit in both cases reached the same result by the same method, by dis-
regarding the capital asset question and considering only the sale or ex-
change question.
Sale or Exchange. The court in Pounds concluded that no capital gains
transaction occurred concerning the interest purchased from Elrod because
of the lack of a sale or exchange. The court stated that the claim or right
which Pounds held against Gilson was extinguished or collected, not sold
or exchanged. It is unquestionable that a sale or exchange as used in sec-
"SE.g., in Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1958) the taxpayer held an
exclusive contract to purchase coal from a mine. The court in discussing the validity of a capital
asset said: "While the contract right here surrendered was 'property' of value it carried with it
no direct interest in the mine itself, or in the coal produced until delivery f.o.b. car or truck. It
was a naked contract right." Id. at 348.
39 See cases and report cited in note 3 supra.
"In Pat O'Brien, 25 T.C. 376 (1955) petitioner Ryan acquired a contract right to 10 per
cent of the profits from a motion picture by selling the story from which the movie was made.
Sale of 50 per cent of this interest in the profits resulted in a capital gain. In Pacific Fin. Corp.,
12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 419 (1953) petitioner bought the right to receive the first $550,000 in
profits for $450,000. After receiving $375,000, petitioner sold all his rights for $175,000. The
$100,000 gain was held to be taxable at capital gain rates.
"'E.g., Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1958); Commissioner v. Starr
Bros., 204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953); Pat N. Fahey, 16 T.C. 105 (1951).
42 306 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1962).
3id. at 306.
[Vol. 21
tion 1222 of the Code comprehends intangible property, including con-
tract rights.' But previous cases have held that a taxpayer who collects a
debt or claim has extinguished his claim and not sold or exchanged it to
the obligor.'" These courts reason that no property was transferred to the
obligor,"6 hence, the other half of the sale or exchange, a receipt of property
by the other party to the transaction, is lacking. Therefore, the payment
by Gilson to Pounds was a payment of an obligation according to its terms,
not a sale or exchange.
If Pounds had sold his interest to a third party, a capital gain undeniably
would result even if the purpose of the sale was to avoid a higher tax rate."
The court in Pounds realized this possibility and stated that the distinction
between a sale to a third party and the collection from Gilson may be
formalistic, nevertheless the distinction is meaningful because special tax
treatment to capital transactions is to facilitate the disposal of appreciated
property, and after Gilson sold the land, Pounds no longer had control over
the timing of his income realization.
IV. JOINT VENTURE
A joint venture, a modern legal term unknown to the common law,'
is an association of two or more persons to carry out a single business
enterprise for profit. 9 If a joint venture can be established, each joint
venturer will have an interest in a joint venture, and the sale or exchange
of property held in a joint venture might constitute capital gain or loss.
This is true because the Code treats a joint venture as a partnership,'" and
the character of any item of income included in a partner's income will be
determined as if such item were realized directly from the source from
which realized by the partnership, or incurred in the same manner as in-
curred by the partnership."' Thus if the land when sold to a third party
" Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450 (loth Cir. 1950) (cancellation of an exclusive agency con-
tract held a sale of a capital asset).
4 Fairbanks v. United States, 306 U.S. 436, 437 (1939) ("Payment and discharge of a bond
is neither sale nor exchange within the normally accepted meaning of the words"); Hale v. Hel-
vering, 85 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (settlement of a note for less than full value is not a sale
or exchange and does not give rise to a capital loss); Pat N. Fahey, 16 T.C. 105 (1951) (no sale
or exchange where an attorney received an assignment of an interest in a fee and, upon settlement
of the related litigation, was paid for his part of the fee).
4 Bingham v. Commissioner, 105 F.2d 971, 972 (2d Cir. 1939); Hale v. Helvering, 85 F.2d
819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
" Conrad N. Hilton, 13 T.C. 623 (1949).
4 Finney v. Terrell, 276 S.W. 340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). At common law an enterprise of
a limited character, such as is now called a joint venture, was regarded as within the principles
governing partnerships, as an informal kind of partnership, and the courts made no attempt to
distinguish the one from the other. Today the distinction is that a partnership is formed for the
transaction of a business of a particular kind and character, while a joint venture is related to a
single transaction.
49J. MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 35.05 (1964); 48 C.J.S. Joint Adventures § 1
(1947). There is no exact definition of a joint venture, but this is one of several the authorities
accept as a general definition. Another general definition is a special combination of two or more
persons, where in some specific venture a profit is jointly sought without any actual partnership or
corporate designation. A joint venture is usually, but not necessarily, limited to one transaction,
though the business of conducting such a venture to successful termination may continue for a
number of years.
5°INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 761(a): "For purposes of this subtitle the term 'partnership'
includes . . . joint venture, .
5 1d. S 702(b).
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was the subject of a joint venture, the gain would be a capital gain both
to the "partnership" and to a "partner."
The courts, to determine the existence of a joint venture, consider all
the facts and circumstances of the particular situation along with the
parties' intent. The basic criteria for determining the existence of a joint
venture are: (1) the agreement between the parties, (2) the parties' joint
interest, (3) the sharing of profits and losses, 2 (4) the mutual control of
the property, and (5) the fiduciary relationship."
Because the existence of a joint venture depends upon the facts and cir-
cumstances of the particular situation, the results obtained in the various
jurisdictions by applying the concepts of a joint venture are neither con-
sistent nor clear. Another reason the results are inconsistent" in the tax
court and in the federal courts sitting in tax cases is that these courts look
to the state substantive law to determine the rights held by alleged joint
venturers." In Texas, the criteria of a joint venture are well recognized"6
and the purchase and resale of real estate, as in Pounds, leads to no prob-
lem in creating a joint venture if it meets the prerequisites.
In the Pounds case, the court interpreted the facts as a normal broker-
age transaction concerning real estate. Since the brokers and Gilson entered
into an agreement concerning the subsequent sale of the land instead of
receiving their normal commissions, the possibility of a joint venture be-
comes a necessary consideration. The scope of the entire transaction shows
that the parties had a community of interest concerning the land because
of their joint effort in procuring the purchase of the land and because of
the possibility of monetary gain if the land sells for a profit. 7 A long line
of cases has established the rule that employment agreements allowing a
" In the Pounds case different interpretations of the agreement are possible concerning the shar-
ing of losses. One is that Pounds had not agreed to absorb a share of the loss if the land ultimately
sold at a loss. Because joint ventures are generally governed by the law of partnership and under
partnership law each partner is to share in the losses subject to any agreement between the partners,
another interpretation of the agreement is that Pounds and Gilson agreed that Pounds need not
share in any loss.
5 Taubman, What Constitutes a Joint Venture?, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 640 (1956).
54Compare, e.g., Tate v. Knox, 131 F. Supp. 514 (D. Minn. 1955) (sharing of losses not
necessary to the creation of a joint venture) with Balestrieri & Co. v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 867
(9th Cir. 1949) (sharing of losses is an essential element under California law).
"
5 Flanders v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 935 (N.D. Cal. 1959); Tate v. Knox, 131 F. Supp.
514 (D. Minn. 1955).
6 The necessary elements to create a joint venture in Texas are as follows: (1) an agreement,
implied or express, Donald v. Phillip, 13 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929); Gill v. Smith, 233
S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error 'ef. n.r.e.; (2) a community of interest, Brown v. Cole,
155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956); Mummert v. Stekoll Drilling Co., 352 S.W.2d 526 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.; (3) a sharing of both profits and losses, Brown v. Cole, supra;
Mummert v. Stekoll Drilling Co., supra; (4) a mutual right to control the subject matter of the
enterprise, Brown v. Cole, supra; Mummert v. Stekoll Drilling Co., supra; (5) a fiduciary relation-
ship, Whatley v. Cato Oil Co., 115 S.W.2d 1205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Warner v. Winn, 145
Tex. 302, 197 S.W.2d 338 (1946); (6) intention-considered in scope of entire agreement, Luling
Oil & Gas Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 144 Tex. 475, 191 S.W.2d 716 (1945).
5 Holcombe v. Lorino, 124 Tex. 446, 455, 79 S.W.2d 307, 311 (1935): "The authorities
sustain the general rule that there must be a community of interest and participation in the profits.";
Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 631, 291 S.W.2d 704, 709 (1956): A joint venture "is in the nature
of a partnership engaged in the joint prosecution of a particular transaction for mutual profit ...
For a joint adventure to exist there must be a community of interest both as to the profits and
losses, if any. . . . The relationship being in the nature of a partnership, losses must be shared
as well as profits." (Citation omitted.).
NOTES
party to receive a percentage of the net profits of the business for services
rendered does not of itself create a joint venture."' In these cases the courts
reason that the employee has no right to dispose of the interest as a prin-
cipal in a joint business. The Pounds case is distinguishable from the em-
ployment cases in that Pounds had an interest freely disposable, exemplified
by the act of Pounds' purchasing of Elrod's interest.
All jurisdictions uniformly require joint control over the subject matter
of the venture." Because the agreement stated that Pounds had no title
interest in the land, he could not control the use or disposition of the land.
This control was entirely in the discretion of Gilson. The taxpayer's only
control over the subject matter of the joint venture was his control as an
expert appraiser in procuring a suitable investment for the joint venture.
A possible but invalid interpretation of the case is that Pounds and Gilson
had mutual control concerning the purchase of a suitable investment, but
after the purchase Pounds relinquished his control to Gilson. Pounds did
not procure the second sale, and he had no voice as to when or to whom the
land, if at all, would be sold. Thus, Pounds had no control.
This result seems definitely correct despite an early case, Reid v. Shaffer,"
reaching a contrary result on similar facts. In that case, a defendant inter-
ested complainant in the acquisition of a leasehold. Complainant agreed
to pay the price demanded, and he and the defendant entered into a con-
tract providing that for compensation for his services defendant should
receive a percentage of the expected profits of the transaction.6 The court
held that the enterprise was a joint venture on the basis of profits since
what Reid, the defendant, was to receive "was not 'commissions,' as upon
an agency, or 'compensation' for services rendered, whatever the contract
says . . . ."" The court uses the phrase, "on the basis of profits," 3 when re-
ferring to the character of the joint venture. This is the character of the
joint venture in the Pounds case. But it seems unsound to say such an
enterprise can exist because profits are always sought. Control of the sub-
ject matter of the venture must encompass something tangible rather than
mere profits. No such control was present in either case.
The control prerequisite lacking in Pounds is caused by Gilson's reluct-
ance to give Pounds an interest in the land. A joint venture could have
"' Friedlander v. Hillcoat, 14 S.W. 786, 788 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1890): "Where the interest
in the profits arises from the fact that they are looked to as a fund affording compensation for
the services of the person engaged in the business, and not as property to which he has a right,
by reason of his being a part owner of the principal, he is in such case not a partner."; Austin
Bldg. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 403 S.W.2d 499, 504 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) error
rel. n.r.e.: "Earlier our Supreme Court held that to constitute a joint adventure the sharing must
be by virtue of right as principal in the joint business, not as mere compensation for services.";
McCord v. Fort Worth Nat'l Bank, 275 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.
"'In Texas a leading case is C.C. Roddy, Inc. v. Carlisle, 391 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965) error ref. n.r.e.
60249 F. 553 (6th Cir. 1918).
61 The complainant purchased the leasehold from the owner and then sublet the premises back
to the original owner. Complainant was first to recover the purchase price through payments of
rent from the sublessee, and then defendant was entitled to a percentage of any subsequent "profits"
by virtue of the rent payments.
62249 F. at 561.63 Id
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